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NO. 14 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
Put the Ball in Tunisia’s Court 
New Government and Urgency of Reform Require Modified EU Approach 
Isabelle Werenfels 
Despite a hostile environment, Tunisia’s democratisation process since 2011 has 
survived and progressed. Yet crucial structural reforms to ensure effective govern-
ance, economic growth and resilient democracy have yet to be implemented. Elec-
tions in 2019 indicated a popular desire for a strong push for reforms. A new govern-
ment took office at the end of February, but it remains to be seen how functional it 
will be. It encompasses parties whose views on certain questions are fundamentally 
opposed. This creates a dilemma for Tunisia’s external partners: they would like 
to accelerate the pace of reforms but have little to show for their attempts to prod 
Tunisia into action. One option for spurring Tunisian initiative would be more tar-
geted incentives for reforms and clearer conditionalities for financial assistance. 
Germany’s reform partnerships are already a move in that direction, and Germany 
could use its EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2020 to persuade external 
donors to take a common line. 
 
The death of President Béji Caïd Essebsi in 
July 2019 and the subsequent presidential 
and parliamentary elections have reshaped 
Tunisia’s political landscape. The new presi-
dent, Kaïs Saïed, is a constitutional lawyer 
who received more than 70 percent of the 
votes. He is regarded as modest and sincere 
but politically inexperienced. Apart from 
Ennahda, which remains the largest party, 
the other main parties were almost wiped 
out. In their place anti-establishment forces 
from left to right did well, often employing 
populist rhetoric. Ultimately the election 
result – nine years after the end of the 
dictatorship – reflects the wish of many 
Tunisians to see a fresh attempt at reform, 
this time with a stronger social and eco-
nomic focus. After the election the public 
showed effervescent optimism. Opinion 
polling in October 2019 found 78 percent 
confident that the next five years will be 
better than the past five; only 6 percent 
feared the opposite. 
The protracted process of forming a gov-
ernment put a damper on those high expec-
tations. In early 2020 parliament rejected 
the cabinet put forward by Ennahda’s 
nominee for prime minister. In a second 
round the president’s personal choice of 
prime minister, Elyes Fakhfakh, succeeded 
in forming a government. Fakhfakh had 
already served as a minister from 2011 to 
2014. As the candidate of the tiny social 
democratic Ettakatol he received just 0.34 
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percent of the votes in the 2019 presidential 
election. 
Half the new ministers are independent 
technocrats, the other half politicians from 
very different parties: the moderate Islamist 
and economically liberal-leaning Ennahda, 
the secular liberal Tahya Tounes of former 
prime minister Youssef Chahed, the social 
democratic Attayar and the left-wing, pan-
Arabist Echaâb. 
The opposition is also extremely diverse 
ideologically. The largest opposition party 
is the secular liberal Qalb Tounes. Other 
relevant currents include the conservative 
Al-Karama and the anti-Islamist Parti Destou-
rien Libre. The latter seeks to restore aspects 
of authoritarian rule, which it regards as 
having been positive. 
Reforms Necessary, 
Circumstances Difficult 
The Fakhfakh government stands under 
great pressure to show results. Firstly, public 
finances are extremely tight. Debt servicing 
alone consumes about one-fifth of the 2020 
state budget, and tourism revenues can be 
expected to collapse entirely as the effects 
of the corona virus ripple out. In order to 
maintain liquidity the government needs 
to negotiate rapidly with the International 
Monetary Fund to release loans totalling 
more than $1.2 billion that have been held 
back pending completion of promised 
reforms. 
Secondly: In order to overcome the on-
going economic crisis without accumulat-
ing even more debt, the Tunisian economy 
needs to be dynamised, integration in the 
global economy stepped up and new jobs 
created. Alongside fundamental reforms 
of the fiscal, financial and credit systems 
this also requires efficiency improvements 
in the administration, faster approval pro-
cesses and education reforms orientated 
on the needs of the labour market. 
Thirdly, the government must respond to 
high public expectations: As confirmed by 
surveys in 2018 and 2019, what Tunisians 
want most is economic recovery, greater 
purchasing power, better services (especially 
in the state health and education systems), 
a reduction in social inequality and not least 
more determined action against corruption. 
Fourthly, civil society activists in particu-
lar press for reforms designed to consolidate 
the young democracy. They demand trans-
parency and accountability in the security 
sector, greater powers for parliament and 
local elected representatives, the end of in-
fluence on the judiciary by powerful politi-
cal and business interests, and full realisa-
tion of the terms of the constitution. To 
this day there is still no constitutional court 
because most appointments have been 
blocked in parliament by party-political 
squabbling. 
Obstacles to reform 
Various reasons can be identified for the 
failure of the outgoing coalition of Ennahda 
and Nidaa Tounes to implement important 
structural reforms: 
Veto actors and entrenched practices. The cen-
tral veto actors include the highly influen-
tial trade union confederation, the UGTT, 
which has repeatedly succeeded in delaying 
or watering down budget cuts demanded by 
the IMF and mobilised sections of the popu-
lation against liberalisation initiatives in 
trade and other sectors. 
Networks in business, administration 
and politics that work to preserve privileges 
acquired under the old regime are at least 
as influential. They fear competition, trans-
parency and accountability and resist fiscal 
reforms, new regulatory regimes and moves 
to bolster the independence of the judiciary. 
The interests of these networks of patronage 
are also reflected in repeated attempts by 
Nidaa Tounes to torpedo the transitional jus-
tice process, in resistance from police unions 
against greater accountability, and in the 
rejection (also widespread in the employers’ 
organisation UTICA) of trade liberalisations 
that could endanger existing monopolies. 
To date political will to stand up to these 
powerful networks has been lacking. Here 
Ennahda’s much lauded policy of consensus 
was likely a factor: Although Ennahda had 
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been persecuted during the dictatorship 
and is regarded as rather reform-orientated, 
it decided in 2013 to cooperate with the 
elites from the old system. Concern for 
national stability and avoiding a return to 
illegality likely played a role too. The out-
come saw an important potential driver 
of reform mutate into a status quo actor. 
Capacity deficits and silo mentality. The ob-
stacles to reform also included the poorly 
resourced parliament, which has been over-
whelmed by new legislation in the course 
of the transition. Above all there is a lack 
of cooperation within the government and 
between ministries, while the bureaucracy 
also remains inefficient and susceptible to 
corruption. Like the World 
Bank, European trade and develop-
ment actors complain about enormous 
delays and cashflow problems, partly as a 
result of a silo mentality in the ministries, a 
lack of flexibility in the administration, and 
cumbersome approval processes. A survey 
of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
2019 found more than 70 percent of 
respondents reporting that the public 
administration was a major obstacle to 
development; 28.8 percent said there were 
“incentives” to bribe the administration for 
a service. In the 2019 Global Competitive-
ness Ranking from the World Economic 
Forum Tunisia occupied 87th place out of 
141. 
Effect of the “democratisation bonus”. Since 
2011 the European Union and member 
states like Germany have given Tunisia 
greater diplomatic and financial support 
than any other Arab country. The grounds to 
do so included Tunisia’s role as a depend-
able counter-terrorism and migration man-
agement partner and the repercussions 
of the Libyan civil war. But the most impor-
tant reason for such massive support was 
and remains Tunisia’s position as the only 
country in the region to have successfully 
democratised. 
After almost a decade, Tunisia’s govern-
ment appears to think it can take this 
“democratisation bonus” for granted, espe-
cially as it continues to flow despite the 
absence of structural reforms. That attitude 
was reflected in Tunisia’s indignation when 
the European Union put it on its money-
laundering blacklist in 2018 following a 
recommendation by the international 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Tunis 
had ignored European warnings that action 
would have to be taken. The expectation 
that the EU would come to Tunisia’s rescue 
resurfaced in the communication over the 
negotiations over the free trade agreement, 
which is controversial in Tunisia. Because 
the government plainly lacked the political 
will, the EU took charge of the communica-
tion with Tunisian civil society. Examples 
like that suggest that European overactivity 
is not necessarily productive for Tunisian 
initiative. 
New constellations – 
new opportunities? 
Pronouncements by the new prime minis-
ter and the terms of the coalition agree-
ment suggest that the new government is 
fully aware of the need for reforms and the 
obstacles to their implementation. Its prior-
ities include improving coordination be-
tween ministries, a clampdown on corrup-
tion and following the recommendations of 
the so-called Truth and Dignity Commission 
for transitional justice. In addition, both 
President Kaïs Saïed and the coalition mem-
bers Echaâb and Attayar place great weight 
on Tunisian sovereignty. This would imply 
that they will want greater influence over 
and “ownership” of reform processes. At 
the same time the implementation of eco-
nomic reforms is likely to test the political 
elites’ ability to compromise: Tensions be-
tween advocates of statist and free-market 
agendas within the government are inevi-
table; the government’s majority in parlia-
ment is small, and power struggles loom 
between the parliamentary speaker – En-
nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi – and 
the popular President Kaïs Saïed. 
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Lessons for the European Union 
Tunisia’s partners in the EU would be well 
advised to leave the initiative to Tunis. The 
will to reform cannot be imposed from out-
side. But messaging, incentives and action 
can be configured to strengthen pro-reform 
actors and increase the pressure on Tuni-
sian partners to cooperate. Germany has 
an important role to play, as Tunisia’s most 
important bilateral partner in terms of 
financial volume alongside France. The Ger-
man EU Council Presidency from July 2020 
would offer an opportunity for a reset to 
seek the following measures: 
Demand and promote Tunisian initiative. In 
all forms of cooperation, the initiative needs 
to come from Tunis, as has long been the 
case with civil society actors. From that 
perspective the EU should certainly avoid 
insisting on reviving the contested free 
trade talks, and instead wait for Tunisian 
initiatives and proposals. 
Ex-post funding mechanisms for cooperation 
with the government. Experience with the 
reform partnerships initiated by Germany 
in 2017, for example in finance and bank-
ing, suggests that the impetus for reforms 
increases and their pace accelerates if funds 
are not released until jointly agreed steps 
have actually been accomplished. Inter-
departmental projects also encourage co-
operation between ministries. The principle 
of “cash on delivery” should be expanded 
to all direct state aid from external actors, 
specifically taking into consideration goals 
that are both proposed by Tunis and am-
bitious. 
Strengthen incentives for reform. The gov-
ernment has stronger incentives to carry 
through sensitive reforms if it can demon-
strate progress to the population, such as 
the conversion of external debt into project 
funds, expanded quotas for work visas for 
European states experiencing skilled labour 
shortages, or specific concessions on agri-
cultural trade. 
Promote local expertise and skilling. Tunisia 
is crawling with international development 
experts. European actors could make more 
and better-targeted use of Tunisian exper-
tise, including from the Tunisian diaspora. 
Tunis has already begun to implement a 
dual education system – with apprentice-
ships parallel to purely academic educa-
tion – with German assistance, and this 
needs to be expanded. Despite there being 
around 600,000 unemployed in 2019, Ger-
man enterprises had difficulties finding 
skilled applicants for thousands of vacan-
cies. 
Improve European coordination. Since 2011 
about €10 billion have flowed to Tunis in 
official European development aid alone, 
without heed to synergies and coordina-
tion. Agreements are possible, as demon-
strated by the security cooperation since 
2015: In response to terrorist attacks, Euro-
pean and US actors coordinate with Tunisia 
and share tasks. In order to strengthen 
transparency and coordination, Germany 
could publish a full list of German-funded 
cooperation projects on a digital platform, 
in the hope of encouraging other European 
and external actors. 
The aforementioned measures offer 
Tunisia an opportunity to realise changes 
that are desired by important actors within 
and outside the new government – to pro-
gress from being the object of well-meaning 
external development ambitions to become 
the active subject and shaper of its own 
future. 
Dr Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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